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AND IRAQI DESTRUCTION 
OF KUWAITI OIL
B Y
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I
The extent of the destruction inflicted on the Kuwaiti oil industry by the 
Iraqi armed forces during its seven month occupation of Kuwait was 
indeed massive. Estimâtes suggest that between 80-85 percent of the coun- 
try’s 950 oil wells were damaged or destroyed (1). In the Greater Burgan 
field itself, which lies just outside the capital of Kuwait City, every one of 
the 684 operating wells was dynamited (2). In excess of 500 wells continue 
to burn (3). Many others pour noxious gases into the air or lakes of oil onto 
the surrounding landscape (4). The current rate of loss to fïre alone is 4.5- 
5 million barrels per day (bpd) (5), as much as Japan consumes every 
day (6) and twice what is used on a daily basis in West Germany (7). It 
may take 2 years or more to extinguish ail the blazes (8) and cost as much 
as $ 5 billion (9). Efforts fix the total amount of crude oil to be lost by 
Kuwait at no less than 9 billion barrels, 10 percent of Kuwait’s reser­
ves (10), or 1 percent of the world’s total reserves (11). And the environ- 
mental damage suffered by the Persian Gulf aquahabitat as a resuit of the
(*) Professor of Law, University of Tulsa ; W.B. Cutting Fellow (1980-1981), J.S.D. (1987) 
Columbia University ; Associate Director, National Energy Law and Policy Institute (1982-1983, 
1984-1986).
(1) See L o r c h , «Burning Wells Turn Kuwait into Land of Oily Blackness », N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 6, A -l, col. 5, at A-7, col. 5.
(2) Id., at A-l, col. 5.
(3) See I b r a h im , «Eires Could Burn for Up to 2 Years», N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1991, at A-4, 
col. 1.
(4) See Tulsa World, Mar. 23, 1991, at B-6, col. 2.
(5) See I b r a h im , «Slow Recovery is Seen for Kuwait and Iraq Oil», N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 
1991, at C-2, col. 6.
(6) See 1989 Energy Statistics Sourcebook, 243 (Penn Well Pub. Co., 1989) (4.7 million bpd in 
1988).
(7) Id. (2.4 million bpd in 1988).
(8) See L o r c h , supra, note 1 at col. 6.
(9) Id., at A-7, col. 6 (suggesting a cost o f from $ 3-10 million per well).
(10) See I b r a h im , swpra, note 3 at col. 1.
(11) On the world’s reserves see 1989 Energy Statistics Sourcebook, supra, note 6 at 123 
(suggesting approximately 900 billion barrels in 1989).
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8-11 million barrels discharged from the Sea Island loading terminal (12) is 
likely to be felt for years to corne (13). Before coalition forces could bomb 
the pipe lines supplying the terminal (14), a slick 10 miles wide and 35 miles 
long escaped into the Gulf, threatening the wide diversity of animal and 
plant life located there (15).
In the event settlement of réparation claims commences pursuant to the 
obligations of the United Nations’ cease-fïre resolution (16), and disposition 
reflects compensation for destruction illegally inflicted (17), at least two 
specifïc international légal issues will merit close considération. The fïrst 
has to do with whether article 53 of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the 
Protection of Civilian Persons (Civilians Convention) (18), or article 23(g) of
(12) See A p p l e , «Relentless Tide of Oil Fouis Shores of Empty Saudi City», N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 28, 1991, A - l ,  col. 3 at A -4 , col. 3.
(13) See H o iu s h a , «U.S. Companies to Join Bid to Minimize Gulf Oil Spill», N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 29, 1991, at A-5, col. 1.
(14) See N .Y . Times, Jan. 28, 1991, at A-5, col. 1.
(15) See W a l d , «Currents, Not Man, W ill  Décidé the Spill’s Effects», N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 
1991, A-5, col. 3 at col. 4.
(16) U.N. Security Council Res. 674 (Oct. 29, 1990), reprinted in 1 Dispatch 239-240 (Nov. 5, 
1990) (U.S. Dept. o f State), very clearly reminded Iraq « that under international law it is liable 
for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, and their nationals 
and corporations, as a resuit of the invasion and illégal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq ». The 
April 3, 1991, Security Council Res. 687 on cease-fïre followed this by obligating Iraq to make 
réparations for its illégal activities. See Resolution reprinted in 2 Dispatch 236 (Apr. 8, 1991).
(17) War claims have often been settled politically through treaties. International arbitral 
settlement applying légal rules is o f comparatively recent origin. See B o r c h a r d , Diplomatie 
Protection of Citizens Abroad, 248 (1915). On some early cases see R a l s t o n , Venezuelan Arbitra- 
iions of 1903 (1904), at 762 (Petrocelli case), 900 (Bembelista case). On légal liability for war 
crimes see Hague Convention IV (1907), 36 Stat. 2277, art. III ; H a n n a , «Légal Liability for 
War Damage », 43, Mich. L. Rev., 1057 (1945) ; W o r m e r , Collection of International War Damage 
Claims (1944). Resolution 687 provides that settlement of claims against Iraq will be conducted 
under the supervision of the United Nations. Paragraph 16 of the Resolution is not clear on 
whether ail the destruction flowing from the invasion is compensable simply because of the inva- 
sion’s illégal nature. The paragraph just « réaffirma that Iraq, ..., is liable under international law 
for any direct loss, damage, ..., or injury ... as a resuit of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait ». To the extent the claims against Iraq will be honored only when destruction 
violated the laws of armed conflict, the parameters of that body of international law take on 
genuine signifîcance.
It should also be noted that at one time there was considérable talk about war crimes trials 
for Saddam Hussein and his political associâtes. Within a few weeks following the coalition vie- 
tory against Iraq, most of the public statements about war crimes trials subsided. This may have 
reflected : a desire to avoid complicating the release of prisoners of war and hostages ; appréhen­
sion about undermining domestic dissention within Iraq by providing Saddam Hussein with a 
pan-Arab rallying point ; récognition of the variety of foreign policy implications associated with 
trials in absentia. For examples of literature conceming the wisdom of post-World War II war 
crimes trials see e.g., S. Glueck, War Griminals, Their Prosecution and Punishment (1944) ; 
Finch, « Rétribution for War Crimes », 37, Am. J. Int’l LM 8 (1943) ; Levy, « The Law and Proce­
dure of War Crime Trials », 1943, Proc. Am. Soc'y Int’l L ., 29 (1943) ; Anderson, « The Utility 
of the Proposed Trial and Punishment of Enemy Leaders», 37, Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., 1081 (1943).
(18) T.I.A.S., No 3365, Art. 53, provides : « Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real 
or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the state, or 
to other public authorities, or to social or coopérative organizations is prohibited, except where 
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military opérations».
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the régulations annexed to Hague Convention IV of 1907 (19), sets out the 
applicable rule for assessing the lawfulness of Iraq’s destructive activity. 
Reports of the burnings of the oil fïelds and the discharge into the Gulf did 
not surface until several days after the coalition bombing campaign began 
on January 17, 1991, more than fïve months into the occupation of 
Kuwait (20). Thus, given the presumptively responsive nature of the 
destruction, should Iraq’s activity be j udged by the terms of a provision 
dealing with behavior of an occupying power, or by the terms of one setting 
forth the limits on the methods and means of military engagement ? The 
second question focuses on the doctrine of military necessity and concerns 
whether the destruction in Kuwait can qualify for the protection accorded 
by that concept (21). Analysts have speculated Iraq discharged oil from the 
Sea Island terminal to foui Saudi desalinization plants and complicate an 
amphibious assault (22), while the oil fïelds were burned to deny coalition 
forces access to the oil when the ground offensive began (23), secure troop 
and material emplacements in Kuwait by clouding aerial conditions (24), or 
cover retreat from Kuwait by the Iraqi armed forces (25). In view of the 
fact the doctrine of military necessity is captured as an exemption to the 
prohibition on destruction of property of both article 53 as well as 
article 23(g), could any or ail of these explanations serve to exculpate Iraq 
from wrong doing for which compensation would have to be made ?
This brief Comment is directed at the latter question alone, with par- 
ticular attention devoted to the issue of whether appraisals of claims of 
military necessity are to look beyond the obvious need to link the specific 
action under considération with some legitimate military objective, and 
consider, as a countervailing factor able to weaken an otherwise 
appropriate reference to the defense, that the nation raising necessity was 
engaged in an aggressive and illégal war from the outset. Notwithstanding 
this Comment’s limited nature, it seems somewhat safe to suggest that, for
(19) 36 Stat. 2277, Art. 23(g) provides that it shall be prohibited : «To destroy or seize the 
enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities 
of war ». On article 23(g)’s applicability to public and private property, see M . M cD otjgal and 
F . F e l ic ia n o , Law and Minimum World Public Order, 675, N. 454 (1961) ; G . v o n  G l a ïïn , The 
Occupation of Enemy Territory, 227 (1957). Compare C. G r a b e r , The Development of the Law of 
Belligerent Occupation 1863-1914, at 208 (1949) (« apparently deals with private property >>), with 
2, H. L e v i e , Gode of International Armed Conflict, 766 (1986) (suggesting applicable to public 
property alone).
(20) See Sh e n o n , « Coalition Forces Moving Toward Kuwait Front —  10.000 Sorties », N. Y. 
Times, Jan. 23, 1991, at A-l, col. 6.
(21) Excellent discussions of military necessity are contained in M . M cD otjgal and 
F . F e l ic ia n o , supra, note 19 at 671-679 ; G . v o n  G l a h n , supra, note 19 at 224-231 ; 
B. R o d r ic k , The Doctrine of Necessity in International Law, 58-82 (1928) ; D o w n e y , « The Law 
of War and Military Necessity », 47, Am. J. int’l L.y 254 (1953).
(22) See S h e n o n , « Huge Slick Still a Threat to Saudi Water Plants», N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 
1991, at A-l, col. 3.
(23) See Tulsa World, Jan. 23, 1991, at A -l, col. 5.
(24) See Sh e n o n , supra, note 20.
(25) Id.
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a variety of reasons, the answer to the former question, the question about 
the applicable law, identifies the prohibition on destruction contained in 
article 53 of the Civilians Convention as governing only destruction in a 
case of occupation uncontested by outside military challenge (26). Once 
preparatory or full-scale external military opposition to the occupation is 
launched, destruction in occupied territory by the oceupying power is con- 
trolled by the prohibition reflected in article 23 (g) of the Hague régula­
tions (27).
II
Iraq would seem to face substantial impediments in demonstrating the 
acceptability of any of the justifications mentioned above that have been 
ventured by analysts. The language of 23(g) allows departure from the 
basic prohibition contained in that article whenever destruction is
(26) Iraq is a party to the Civilians Convention and is bound by its terms. The reasons for 
article 53 not applying therefore have to be found elsewhere. On that matter, at îeast four such 
reasons happen to exist. First, any other conclusion would be incongruent with the distinction 
evidenced in the Lieber Code of 1863, the Brussels Déclaration of 1874, the Oxford Code of 1880, 
and the Hague Régulations of 1899 and 1907 between regulating periods of relative calm and 
periods involving active military hostilities. That distinction has generally subjected « takings » 
to greater régulation than « destruction », due to the absence of the significant and pressing 
demands surrounding the latter. Thus, a complete prohibition on destruction like that in 
article 53 should be confïned to situations that have historically called forth stringent régulation. 
Second, the « military opérations » exception in article 53, and the article’s placement in Part III, 
Section III, entitled « Occupied Territories », rather than Part III, Section II, entitled « General 
Protection of Populations Against Certain Conséquences of War », suggest a narrow reading. 
Indeed, the 1949 Geneva Diplomatie Conference rejected the initial idea of including article 53’s 
prohibition in the much broader Section II. See Report of Committee I I I  to the Plenary Assembly, 
2A, Final Record of the Diplomatie Conference of Geneva, 1949, at 812, 822 (art. 30), and 839 
(art. 48A) (1949). See also comments by Du Pasquier, Switserland, id., at 721 (indicating the 
prohibition be moved to avoid ambiguity with the Hague rules). See also « Report to the Con­
ference from the Second Commission on the Laws and Customs of War on Land » (July 5, 1899), 
reprinted in Reports to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, at 137, 145 (ed. J. Scott, 1917) 
(indicating article 23(g) was designed to cover hostilities, not occupation). Third, at the 31st 
meeting of Committee III, the Committee with the task of preparing the Civilians Convention, 
Colonel Du Pasquier, the Rapporteur, observed, against a backdrop of concern that the Commit­
tee not address the laws of the land warfare, that « even if it was not possible to provide for 
protection of property against bombardments or acts of an invading army ... it was necessary to 
arrange for the protection of property in an occupied territory ». See, 2A, Final Record, supra, 
at 719-720 (emphasis added). Finally, comments made at the 1977 Geneva Diplomatie Con­
ference suggest delegates to that Conference understood the prohibition of article 53 as not 
extending beyond instances of occupation uncontested by outside military challenge. See the 
remarks of Mrs. Bindshedler-Robert, International Committee of the Red Cross, III, H. L e v ie , 
Protection of War Victims ; Protocol I  to the 1959 Geneva Conventions, 98, para. 35 an 36 ; id., 
at 99, para. 38.
(27) Though Iraq is not a party to Hague Convention IV and its annexed Régulations, it is 
bound by such as a matter of customary international law. See, Documents on the Laws of War, 
44 (A. Roberts and R. Guelff, eds., 1982) ; U.S. Army Field Manual, 27-10, paras. 6 & 7 (1956). 
On article 23(g) dealing with hostilities, see Report to the Conference from the Second Commission 
on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra, note 26.
« imperatively demanded by the necessities of war» (28). In discharging oil 
into the Gulf and burning oil fïelds in Kuwait, however, the standard 
implicit in that language would appear to have not been met. With regard 
to the burnings to keep oil from falling into the coalition’s hands (29), the 
indubitable requirement for linkage (30) between the action taken and a 
legitimate military objective is absent. No one can dispute the fact that 
depriving the opponent’s forces of refined fuel products serves the permit- 
ted objective of gaining a military advantage. But the trouble in this case 
is that crude oil has no immediate use to invading military forces and exists 
in abundance in Saudi Arabia (31), the country that acted as the staging 
point for the coalition’s counter-offensive. The discharge into the Gulf to 
foui Saudi desalinization plants is only slightly more troublesome, since the 
language of article 23 (g) says nothing as clear about the likelihood of action 
accomplishing a desired purpose as it does about it having to be tied to a 
legitimate military objective. In insisting upon action imperatively 
« demanded » by the necessities of war, however, 23(g) implicitly requires 
something more than action akin to randomly firing in ail directions (32). 
Yet in view of the unpredictability of océan currents, and the impact of 
weather on the flow and direction of océan pollutants (33), the discharge 
from Sea Island to foui the water works on the Saudi coast would seem
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(28) See supra, note 19.
(29) See supra, note 23.
(30) It is clear that the référencé in article 23(g) to action being demanded «by» the 
necessities of war fixes the need to establish a connection between a legitimate military opération 
and the action under considération. The degree of connection required is clarified by the 
reference to the fact that the necessities of war must « imperatively » demand the action taken. 
See generally D o w n e y , «The Law of War and Military Necessity», 47 , Am. J. Int’l L., 251 
(1953).
(31) At the time of the launching of Opération Desert Storm, the Saudi’s were producing 
approximately 9 million bpd, see G r e e n h o u s e , « OPEC Takes Up Oil Price Décision », N. Y. 
Times, Mar. 11, 1991, C-l, col. 3, at C-5, col. 5, from reserves estimated at 170 billion barrels, see 
1989, Energy Statistics Sourcebook, 123 (Penn Well Pub., 1989), approximately 20 % of the total 
world reserves. Saudi Arabia’s need to import refined fuel products is discussed in M il l e r , 
«Saudis Importing Fuel to Fight War», N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1991, at A-4, col. 6. This suggests 
that Iraqi destruction of refined products may stand on a different footing than the destruction 
of crude oil facilities.
(32) Though outside the context of article 23(g), both the « Llandovery Castle case », Animal 
Digest of Int’l Law Cases, Cas No. 235 (1923-1924) and the «Peleus case», I U.N. War Crimes 
Comm’n, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (hereinafter War Grimes Reports), 1 (1945) 
inform the meaning of the doctrine of military necessity. The first involves the massacre of sur- 
vivors of a hospital ship sunk by a German submarine in World War I. The second is factually 
very similar and cornes from the Second World War. In each case the excuse offered was that 
of preventing the relay of information that could jeopardize the submarine involved in the sink- 
ing. In rejecting this argument in both cases, the relavant tribunal had reference to the fact that 
many other things (e.g., débris, oil slicks) could have been helpful in disclosing that kind of infor­
mation. This certainly suggests that by « necessity » is meant that one’s action must be somewhat 
likely to accomplish the desired resuit.
(33) Indeed, reports circulated in the media that the discharges of crude into the Gulf were 
going awry and fouling desalinization plants in Kuwait used to supply fresh water to the occupy- 
ing Iraqi forces.
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hardly in a better position than the burnings to keep crude out of the coali­
tion’s hands.
The justifications of hampering an amphibious assault (34), protecting 
troop and material emplacements (35), and covering retreat from occupied 
Kuwaiti territory (36) are much more complicated. These ail tie the 
destructive actions to a legitimate military objective and pose situations 
where the purpose of the action is very likely to be at least somewhat 
achieved (37). It is quite possible that the evidence adduced with regard to 
such justifications could demonstrate weaknesses in any Iraqi case. Ail 
evidence aside, the reason the justifications are considered herein has to do 
with the controversial matter of whether the concept of military necessity 
reflected in article 23(g) envisions looking to see if the nation invoking the 
doctrine to excuse some destructive action has been engaged in an 
aggressive, illégal war from the very beginning (38). In other words, even 
if we assume an extremely close link to a legitimate military objective, is 
the fact that the destroying nation initiated an illégal war of aggression a 
considération which is relevant under 23 (g) in determining the availability 
of the excuse of military necessity. Little space has been devoted to this 
matter in learned journals. Those scholars who have offered suggestions 
have often done so in an oblique fashion and without articulating any 
elaborate rationale (39). Perhaps this is a conséquence of the fact the 
Nuremberg tribunal acquitted German officiais in two Second World War 
cases involving destruction of property in occupied territory to cover 
retreat (40) without discussing the rôle of Nazi aggression (41) in evaluating 
claims to the doctrine of military necessity (42).
(34) See supra, note 23.
(35) See supra, note 24.
(36) See supra, note 25.
(37) For the contention that a preexisting plan to take destructive action can undermine 
reliance on military necessity as an excuse, see transcript of « Field-Marshall von Manstein case », 
3391-3393 (1949), cited in Dunbar, Military Necessity in War Crimes Trials, 19, Brilish Y.B. 
Int’l L ., 4442 at 450. n. 1 (1952).
(38) See U.N. Security Council Res. 674 (Oct. 29, 1990), para. 8, supra, note 16, characteriz- 
ing Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait as <t illégal ».
(39) Compare J. Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes, 53 (1964) (« The 
effect o f outlawing aggressive war is to remove the légal excuse ... of acts otherwise condemned 
by ail pénal codes ... »), with Latjterpacht, « The Problem of the Révision of the Law of War », 
19, British Y.B. Int’l L., 360 at 378 (1953) (« most of the rules of warfare ..., operate regardless 
of the legality of the war »).
(40) U.S. v. List, 11, Trials o f War Criminals, 759 (1948) ; U.S. v. von Leeb, 12, War Crimes 
Report, 1 (1948).
(41) On the Nuremberg tribunal’s détermination that the Nazi’s had undertaken a war of 
aggression, see Judgment of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) (Oct. 1, 1946), 
reprinted in 41, Am. J. Int’l L., 172 at 186-221 (1947).
(42) Putting aside the two cases referred to, it is not inconceivable that destruction in the 
course of retreat from occupied territory captured through aggression could be adjudged eligible 
for protection under military necessity. In this sense, the Nuremberg cases do not necessarily 
reject the availability of the doctrine in every instance of a war of aggression. The simplest 
scenario making the point would involve a bloodless takeover by one state of the territory of
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The position stated in this Comment is that the fact the nation inflicting 
destruction has undertaken to conduct a war of aggression is indeed a rele­
vant considération which must be incorporated in the évaluation of any 
claim to military necessity (43). To be sure, however, the relevancy of the 
considération is important to the extreme, but it is not the sole, decisive 
considération that invariably tips the scales against the nation endeavoring 
to have the action of its forces excused. The reason for this has to do with 
the varying conditions under which initiating aggression can be carried ont, 
the wide range of motivating factors that may precipitate the aggression, 
and the broad spectrum of interests the destructive action in the occupied 
territory may seek to promote.
III
In advance of setting forth the reasons which suggest the appropriateness 
of this position, a few observations are in order about possible explanations 
supporting the narrower, limited reading of article 23(g)’s exception. Unfor- 
tunately, due to the paucity of detailed commentary on this subject, one 
can only engage in cautious, uninformed spéculation and conjecture. Yet 
even recognizing this complication, a couple rational explanations for a 
narrow reading do come readily to mind.
The flrst possibility is that a narrow reading is best because it avoids 
placing commanding offïcers in a position of dispute with political leaders 
who deliberately insist on the pursuit of clear aggressive designs against 
other nations. If a plan of action for a military campaign were to be subjec- 
ted to a scrutiny that included considération of the campaign’s aggressive 
nature, members of the armed services charged with implementing the plan 
could well find themselves wrangling with political leaders, thereby under- 
mining the kind of discipline required to conduct warfare successfully.
The difficulty with accepting this argument is that it fails to take into 
account the rejection of «superior orders» as an unqualified defense (44). 
Like the explanation for the narrow reading of article 23(g), superior orders 
is based on the importance of discipline within the military. From the 
Nuremberg war crimes experience, it is plain that while discipline is an
another, followed by a military campaign from the outside to oust the illégal occupant. In such 
a situation, it is not perverse to expect a tribunal, evaluating a claim by the occupant to excuse 
destruction of property to cover a retreat, to reach the conclusion that the aggressive and illégal 
nature of the initial occupation does not prevent reliance on military necessity. An approach of 
this sort would stress the bloodless nature of the original aggression as opposed to the péril to 
life and limb encountered by the retreating forces, and balance these with the destruction of 
property involved in covering the retreat.
(43) See id., discussing the idea that aggression is a factor to be weighed against others, and 
not something which always overwhelms ail other factors.
(44) See M . M cD otjgal and F . F e l ic ia n o , supra, note 19, at 690-699.
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extremely important value, it is to be weighed against the prescriptions of 
international law on the methods and means of prosecuting armed conflict. 
Thus, superior orders has not been favorably received when the act leading 
to its invocation was clearly unlawful (45), or was not somehow tangibly 
opposed (46). More importantly, it has not mattered that the order 
involved was that of a political official rather than a military officer (47). 
Especially in view of the mere potential for disputes between commanding 
officers and political leaders having had no determinative influence in the 
context of superior orders, it would be unusual to accord it such influence 
under the exception of article 23(g). Just as an order clearly violative of the 
laws of war cannot serve as the basis for a defense under superior orders, 
so too destruction inflicted in the context of a war that is clearly aggressive 
cannot earn protection on the basis of the exception for destruction 
« imperatively demanded by the necessities of war » (48). I f the value of 
military discipline alone is insufficiënt to assure that invocation of superior 
orders will insulate the claimant where it is plain that an act in contraven­
tion of the laws of war has been commanded, then that value should be 
equally as insufficiënt to assure protection of destructive acts taken during 
the course of any war that is plainly and obviously one of aggression (49).
A second possible explanation for reading article 23(g)’s reference to 
military necessity narrowly enough to exclude considération of the legality 
of the overall conflict in which the destruction at issue has occurred, con­
cerns the irrationality of war itself. In view of that basic fact, it would 
seem perfectly sensible for any reasoning person to conclude that 
incongruity would arise if the rules of armed conflict were interpreted as
(45) For cases accepting this proposition see «Trial of Wielen», 11, War Grimes Reports, at 
47 (1947) ; « Trial of Renoth », I d at 78 (1946) ; « Peleus », swpra, note 32, at 16 et seq. (1945). 
From the First World War, see «The Llandovery Castle», supra, note 32, at 437-438, where it 
is stated that « if ... an order is universally known to everybody, ..., to be without any doubt 
whatever against the law », then superior orders is no defense.
(46) «The Einsatzgruppen Case », 4, Trials of War Criminals, at 481 (1947), require that one 
invoking superior orders must not have been « in accord with the principle and intent of the 
superior»; it is not enough to just «rebel mentally». See «Trial of Bauer», 8, War Crimes 
Reportst at 16 and 21 (1945), for an example of the kind of showing of opposition required.
(47) See « Judgment of the International Military Tribunal » (Nuremberg), supra, note 41, at 
221 (referring to article 8 of the IMT Charter).
(48) It is recognized that this conclusion has ramifications far beyond that of destruction 
inflicted by an occupying power in occupied territory. Since article 23(g) deals with destruction 
of property during military engagement, to say that the aggressive nature of a war affects the 
destruction the aggressor can take admit® that every single act of destruction taken — and not 
just those in occupied territory inflicted when the aggressor has its status as a occupant 
challenged —  is subject to examination in light of the illégal nature of the war. However, this 
factor alone is not dispositive. Just as it may be that one could determine that destruction to 
cover a retreat from territory occupied through a bloodless invasion may be permissible, see 
supra, note 42, so too it may be that destruction to cover a retreat ordered by a commanding 
official who defïes directives from political and military superiors to push formard with the cam­
paign of aggression may be permissible.
(49) For a statement on what constitutes « aggression », see « Consensus of Définition of 
Aggression», G.A. Res. 3314, 29, U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 at 142 (1974).
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imposing anything more than the most rudimentary of constraints. Régula­
tion of atavistic activity typifying the quintessence of human émotion and 
frustration, and the antithesis of human logic and temperance, should 
demand nothing but simple, practical connections between military objec­
tives and the methods selected for accomplishing them.
As with the fïrst argument for a narrow reading, the instant position, 
too, has problems which make it unconvincing. Most pronounced is the fact 
that article 23(g) itself already reflects expectations regarding rationality. 
By prohibiting destruction which is not essential to attain some legitimate 
military objective, it requires that armed forces engaged in destruction 
refrain from the senseless and unnecessary savagery that conflict might 
otherwise tend to precipitate. l ’or a particular act to merit protection, it 
must not only be claimed as linked to a legitimate military objective but 
shown to be likely to accomplish the objective itself (50). This requirement 
imposes a duty on decisionmakers in the fïeld to consider carefully the 
means selected for prosecuting war (51). Less pronounced, but also eviden- 
cing concern with rationality, is the fact that Hague régulation 23(g) even 
applies to full-scale conflict outside occupied territories (52). Yet if the irra- 
tionality of war supported a narrow reading of the article’s exception, it 
would seem the provision and its requirement that destruction be tied to 
a military objective likely to be accomplished would not have been 
extended to encompass situations of that sort. Such incontestable imposi­
tions of rationality suggest it is not at ail out of character with the thrust 
of 23(g) to read the concept of military necessity as alluding to whether the 
nation whose forces inflicted the destruction at issue initiated a war of 
aggression. To the extent that this reading fixes on commanding offïcers an 
obligation to proceed in a measured and reasoned fashion, it serves to 
transform the ultimate in human irrationality in no way not already dic- 
tated by the very terms of article 23 of the régulations annexed to Hague 
Convention IV.
The third and final possible argument in favor of a narrow reading of 
military necessity is associated with the preceding two by virtue of its 
pragmatic nature. Like the others, it claims that 23(g)’s exception is to be 
given a restricted interprétation because that fits best with the realities 
surrounding international conflict. But rather than developing the notion 
of a broad reading creating tensions between military and political players, 
or incongruity with the fundamental nature of war, this argument centers 
in on the potential for capricious and abusive déterminations by victors
(50) See fcext accompanying supra, notes 28-32.
(51) Contrast this with Kriegsraison geht vor Kriegsmanier, which basically postulâtes that the 
existence of war overrides ail légal limita. The theory is summoned up in the statement inter 
arma silent leges. See O ’B r ie n , «The meaning of Military Necessity in International Law», 1, 
World Polity, 109 119-127 (1957) (discussing the theory of Kriegsraison).
(52) See supra, note 27.
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who sit in judgment of the vanquished. The idea is that any tribunal com- 
prised of those prevailing in war, and called upon to assess the propriety 
of acts of destruction inflicted by those who have been defeated, is very 
likely to frnd the existence of a war of aggression, thus complicating the 
possibility of military necessity ever being successfully invoked.
The weakness in this argument is not its logic, for one would expect that 
the normal human reaction to another who has compelled it to grudgingly 
draw on its valued economic and personal resources would be disgust and 
contempt. The weakness resides rather in the fact that this third possibility 
fails to evidence an appréciation of the structural forces which affect inter­
national decisionmaking. Most importantly in this respect is reciprocity. 
The reciprocal nature of relations in the international arena serves, as in 
every area of human interaction, to moderate the inclination towards abuse 
by those evaluating the conduct of others. Fully cognizant that in the 
future they may find themselves in the docket, nations emerging victorious 
from an international conflict are likely to be as interested in justice and 
fairness, and rules that promote such, as in rétribution for hardships they 
havé been compelled to endure. In spinning the full web of law outlined by 
the starkly skeletal rules of armed conflict, the reality that what is prof- 
fered could well be used to evaluate the future conduct of the one by whom 
it is proffered acts as a powerful incentive to impartiality and even-handed- 
ness. Though the victor may face strong pressures to exact a price from the 
vanquished, the pressures are often checked by the longer-term perspective 
imparted through the processes surrounding the making of international 
décisions (53).
IV
A variety of reasons exist for interpreting article 23(g)’s exception for 
destruction necessitated by the imperatives of war as including considéra­
tion of the legality of the overall conflict started by the nation whose forces 
inflicted the destruction in dispute. Briefly stated, the reasons can be said 
to be based on the concept of reasonableness, the perversity of results 
grounded in a narrow reading, the textual analysis of the terminology used 
to express the military necessity exception, and the implications gleaned 
from other language appearing in both the Hague régulations and Conven­
tion IV to which the régulations are annexed. The first two of these reasons 
could be categorized as pragmatic, in the sense that their focus is resuit-
(53) For reference to the nature of the international decisionmaking process, see M a l l is  on  
and M à l l is o n , « The Judicial Status of Irregular Combatants under the International 
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict », 9, Case W. Res. J. Int'l L., 39, 40-43 (1977) ; S o l f  and 
Cu m m in g s , «A  Survey of Pénal Sanctions Under Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 
August», 12, 1949, id., at 205.
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oriented, and the last two as traditional, in that they turn on the very 
language of the international compact of concern.
The pragmatic explanation based on reasonableness seeks to construe the 
exception of article 23 (g) as ail principles of international law are to be con- 
strued, in a manner which yields a sensible and useful end product. The 
concept of reasonableness is not at ail foreign to either the common law (54) 
or the civil law (55) systems. Stripped of the doctrinal coatings making it 
legally palatable, its emphasis is on viewing rules of law as normative 
devices for securing goals thought by decisionmakers to be compelling. In 
its most unadorned form, reasonableness conceives of law as the hand- 
maiden, not the master, of society. Law serves not to paralyze the ability 
to make the moral judgments implicit in ail décisions of social policy, but 
rather to facilitate the making of décisions in a manner that reflects such 
judgments. From this type of perspective, interprétations regarding the 
provisions of international law regulating armed conflict tend towards the 
production of results that serve the socially essential goal of promoting law- 
observance and discouraging law-violation.
The utility of the concept of reasonableness in understanding the mean- 
ing of légal standards is apparent in international jurisprudence. To begin 
with, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (56) provides that the 
language of international agreements is normally to be given its ordinary 
meaning (57). However, in the event that approach results in a meaning 
which is obviously not reasonable, recourse may be had to means of inter­
prétation designed to correct that situation (58). Reasonableness has also 
been claimed in the opinions of some of the justices of the I.C.J. as a vital 
considération when construing fundamental légal documents (59). Indeed, 
in both the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (60), and the more recent
(54) See e.g., Schenck v. U.S., 249, U.S., 47 (1919) (meaning of a clear constitutional provision 
affected by reasonableness) ; Kobayashi v. Zimring, 566, P.2d, 725 (1977) (resolving dispute not 
controlled by antecedent common law rules in accordance with balancing approach) ; State v. 
Shack, 277, A.2d, 369 (1971) (meaning of a clear statutory provision affected by reasonableness).
(55) Compania Swift De La Plut a, Frigorifica, Creditor’s Proceeding, Sup. Ct. o f Argentina, 
Sept. 4, 1973, translation reprinted in, 6, Lawyer Am ., 330 (1974) (understanding the nature of 
law from the social objectives it seeks to secure).
(56) U.N. Doc. A/GONÎ'. 39/27 (1969), entered into force, Jan. 27, 1980, reprinted in 63, Am. 
J. int’l L., 875 (1969).
(57) Id., art. 31.
(58) Id., art. 32.
(59) See J. A z e v e d o ’s dissent in «Advisory Opinion Concerning the Compétence of the 
General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations », 1959, I.C.J., 4, 23, where 
he says about interprétations of the U.N. Charter that : « To comply with its aims one must seek 
the methods of interprétation most likely to serve the natural évolution of the needs of 
mankind » (Emphasis added). As alluded to above, reasonableness is integrally connected with 
mankind’s needs.
(60) United Kingdom v. Norway, 1951, I.C.J., 128, 133 (Judgment of Dec. 18) (the surround- 
ing realities must serve as the backdrop against which international law is to be understood).
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1984 Gulf of Maine Case (61), the I.C.J. itself appeared somewhat sym- 
pathetic to the notion of viewing law against a backdrop of reasonableness. 
The opinions of the Court in those cases seem to emphasize the influence 
of contextual factors on the international rules governing the conduct of 
nations. Additionally, leading scholars in the field stress the rôle of 
reasonableness. Some are explicit in their insistence that rules of law 
regulating the use of force be considered in light of reasonableness (62), 
while others seem to endorse the idea that factors subsumed by reasonable­
ness have a privileged status in the formation of international law (63). 
Finally, the Vienna Convention, the intimations from the I.C.J., and the 
positions of respected scholars illustrate a primordial fact about ail law. As 
expressed long ago by the renowned English légal historian Sir Henry Sum- 
mer Maine, from the very beginning the rules that comprise law have 
reflected not some antecedent directive mankind is helpless to avoid, but 
rather a judgment about how best to achieve the ambitions society sets 
before itself (64). Récognition of this fundamental fact casts a new light on 
every légal rule. For if law is to assist in the securing of a community’s 
goals, then it must be understood as directing behavior and establishing 
standards reasonably suited to its task.
But how does one move from sensitivity to the importance of reasonable­
ness, to the conclusion that article 23(g)’s exception for destruction 
demanded by the necessities of war is to be construed so as to consider the 
legality of the overall conflict in which the destruction at issue has 
occurred ? This is where the second of the two pragmatic explanations 
cornes in. In short, the basic idea is that a narrow reading of 23(g) produces 
the kind of unreasonable resuit that a broad reading is fully able to avoid.
With regard to the untoward nature of the resuit produced by interpret- 
ing the military necessity doctrine of article 23(g) so as to preclude 
reference to the legality of the overall conflict, it is apparent that anytime 
one nation can invade another and then, to secure its position and insure 
the fruits of its lawlessness are Consolidated, destroy property located there 
by merely establishing a link to a legitimate military objective, the law- 
abiding members of the world community are likely to fînd themselves 
seriously disadvantaged. Once dug in, an adversàry is often incredibly dif- 
ficult to oust. Challenging military forces not only have to contend with the 
same obstacles that every combatant faces when engaged in battle on the
(61) Canada v. U.S., 1984, I.C.J., 246 (Décision of Oct. 12) (antecedent equitable criteria are 
those producing an equitable resuit).
(62) See M . M c D otjgal and F . F e l ic ia n o , supra, note 19 at 218 («reasonableness in par- 
ticular context», suggested in regard to article 51 of the U.N. Charter). See also F a l k , «The 
Beirut Raid in the International Law of Retaliation », 63, Am. J. Int’l L 415 at 437-39.
(63) C. D e  V is s c h e h , Theory and Reality in Public International Law, 157 (Corbett trans. rev. 
ed. 1968) (speaking of « social ends considered desirable » in the context of the formation of 
customary law).
(64) H . M a in e , Ancient Laxot 3-17 (originally pub., 1861) (The World’s Classics, ed. 1931).
open field, but they also have to overcome superior positions associated 
with defensive entrenchment. In the event the illegality of an invasion does 
not function to moderate the destruction an occupying power can inflict to 
maintain its position, the task facing an opponent can be complicated sub- 
stantially (65). In an effort to confound a challenger, the occupying power 
could systematically destroy property in the occupied territory, thereby 
increasing the likelihood that opposition to the aggression would prove 
unsuccessful.
When the exception for destruction demanded by military necessity is 
given a reading which envisions reference to the existence of a war of 
aggression, a nation occupying another through the use of illégal force finds 
itself unable freely to have recourse to article 23(g) to justify destruction 
inflicted in the face of an external challenge. Aggression and occupation 
may put the foreign belligerent in a position of being able to strengthen its 
defenses against efforts to remove it, thus adding to the difficulties a 
challenger would otherwise face on the open field. The fact the occupation 
is the conséquence of a use of force in contravention of international law, 
however, fonctions to undermine the ability to invoke 23(g) to protect 
every act of destruction. The resuit is to place lawless aggression in proper 
rank with the law-abiding behavior of the other members of the world com- 
munity. Uses of force perceived as unacceptable by international standards 
can be addressed without other rules of law being adverted to in order to 
protect the fruits of illegality.
One additional point bears reference here as well. Specifically, construing 
military necessity as including considération of the legality of the overall 
conflict goes beyond simply producing a more reasonable resuit as regards 
acclaiming the importance of law-abiding behavior and decrying law viola­
tion. As already alluded to, the exception in article 23(g) for destruction 
demanded by the necessities of war imposes a modicum of rationality on 
an otherwise irrational manifestation of human émotion (66). To the extent 
that reasonableness connotes an approach directed at a rational resuit, a 
broad reading of 23(g) is certainly more harmonious with the ténor of the 
military necessity exception. A narrow reading, which leaves aside the mat­
ter of the war’s legality, seems somehow out-of-line.
Moving away from the two pragmatic reasons for a broad interprétation, 
and in the direction of the two traditional reasons, attention is called to the
(65) As is well known, Iraq was quickly ousted from Kuwait, a country it had occupied for 
almost seven months. Nonetheless, recent remarks of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, com­
mander of the coalition forces in the Gulf, suggest that had the Iraqi armed forces avoided con- 
centrating combat units in Kuwait itself, a flanking effort would have been much more difficult, 
and, because of the préparations for combat in Kuwait, a consequent ground campaign would 
have been longer, more complex, and much costlier. Interview by David Frost with Gen. 
Schwarzkopf, PBS (aired Mar.29, 1991).
(66) See text accompanying supra, notes 54-64.
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very terms used to express article 23(g)’s exception. The language of 
relevancy speaks of destruction imperatively demanded by the necessities 
of war. Since this is quite different from phraseology that would have sub- 
stituted the word «for» in lieu of the préposition «of»,  it might be con- 
cluded that the exception makes clear a preference for a construction giving 
no weight to whether the overall conflict was one of aggression. However, 
that conclusion should not be reached in haste. It is obvious that reference 
to destruction demanded by the « necessities for war » would make it easier 
to argue that the legality of the conflict is a relevant considération. None­
theless, use of such language would have had the effect of weakening the 
position that the permissibility of destruction also turns on its necessity 
from a purely operational standpoint. In other words, were 23(g) to speak 
of the necessities « for », rather than « of », war, any reference to the matter 
of some particular military opération demanding the destruction would be 
inappropriate.
Reading the verbal configuration which actually appears in article 23(g) 
in a fashion that can support a broad construction may be accomplished, 
especially in view of the influence of reasonableness, without having to 
engage in acrobaties that too substantially twists the understanding of 
what certain words convey. In permitting destruction, the Hague rules use 
of the préposition « of » has meaning only in reference to the « necessities » 
that have « imperatively demanded » action of that unfortunate character. 
That it must be the extant « necessities » driving the destruction clearly 
suggests considération of the exigencies at the very moment the act is 
taken. Just as clearly, however, since those exigencies are themselves con­
comitants of ail the circumstances surrounding the initial use of force 
precipitating the war itself, the most complete picture of the existing 
« necessities » would seem to include the latter circumstances as well. What 
enhances the attractiveness of this position is that the necessities able to 
justify destruction must be those which render such action « imperatively 
demanded ». This is a strict standard, undoubtedly requiring linkages of the 
sort discussed earlier (67). Beyond that, however, enough flexibility is 
incorporated by the standard to allow considération of whether the nation 
inflicting the destruction engaged in a war of aggression. The fact a 
demand must be imperative, if it is to be sufficiënt to support destruction, 
invites reference to a broad spectrum of considérations. Déterminations of 
the imperativeness of any demand that prove the most teeming with 
insight, significance, and perspective, reflect on the widest range of con­
sidérations available. It would be far too parsimonious to comprehend the 
expression «imperatively demanded» in any way other than that which 
reflects on the legality of the overall-conflict in which the destruction in 
issue has occurred.
(67) See text accompanying supra, notes 28-33.
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The final reason for supporting a broad reading of article 23(g) is also 
based on text. To this extent, it fits the traditional, conventional mold just 
as well as the reason drawing on the spécifié terminology of military 
necessity happens to fit that mold. The différence between the two resides 
in the directness of the evidence upon which they draw. The latter arrives 
at its conclusions with regard to the meaning of « imperatively demanded 
by the necessities of war » by virtue of deciphering the words themselves. 
Nothing could be more direct. In the case of the former, though, a more 
circuitous route is utilized. In essence, movement is from the language 
situated in other provisions of the Hague régulations, and Convention IV 
itself, to interprétation of article 23(g)’s exception. By no stretch of the 
imagination could this effort be conceived of as anything but inferential 
and indirect.
The most significant of the textual evidences implying a broad reading 
of 23(g) concerns the understanding that the rules of conduct established 
by the Hague régulations reflect what is acceptable behavior, even after 
military necessity has been considered. The Nuremberg war crimes tribunal 
made that point in its statement that the Hague prohibitions « are superior 
to military necessities of the most urgent nature except where the Régula­
tions themselves provide the contrary » (68). This depicts the Hague rules 
as already reflecting what military necessity allows or prohibits. The only 
variation is when the rides themselves explicitly qualify a prohibition, as 
in article 23(g), by express reference to the concept of necessity (69). In 
cases of that sort, the prohibition thus qualified is susceptible to being 
departed from if necessity is shown to exist. At bottom, this ail means that 
if the prohibitions contained in the Hague rules that are not so qualified 
outlaw conduct which can be linked to military objectives likely to be 
accomplished by the conduct, then the very concept of military necessity 
must be inescapably understood as encompassing considérations far beyond 
mere linkage. The task then becomes one of simply winnowing the 
prohibitory provisions of the Hague rules to ascertain if there exist prohibi­
tions on conduct that can be tied to military objectives likely to be accom­
plished. For if such are present, then whether military necessity is to be 
construed as including reference to more than linkage alone is answered 
indirectly.
The provisions in the Hague régulations of 1907 prohibiting activity 
which can be connected to military objectives likely to be accomplished are 
almost too numerous to count. The most important and représentative 
include not forcing prisoners of war (70) or inhabitants of occupied
(68) «Trial of List» (The Hostages Case), 8, War Crimes Reports, at 69 (1948).
(69) Necessity also appears in arts. 27, 33 and 54 of the Hague Régulations.
(70) See Hague Régulations, supra, notes 19 at art. 6.
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territory (71) to engage in tasks associated with the opérations of war ; not 
forcing inhabitants of occupied territory to supply information about the 
army of the other belligerent (72) ; not abusing the use of a flag of truce 
or the uniform of the enemy (73) ; not employing poison or poisoned 
weapons (74) or killing enemy soldiers who have surrendered (75). In each 
of these cases, there would be distinct military advantages that could be 
gained through violating the relevant restriction. By prohibiting such con­
duct, the Hague rules indicate that military necessity gives thought to a 
far wider range of considérations than linkage and likelihood of accomplish- 
ing military objectives.
Additional indirect evidence corroborâtes the idea of the prohibitions in 
the Hague rules implying that, where military necessity is expressly 
referred to, a broad reading is appropriate. Specifîcally, paragraph 5 of the 
Preamble to Hague Convention IV alludes to the values of humani- 
tarianism and military necessity. This appears through a counterposition- 
ing of « the desire to diminish the evils of war », and the notion of a diminu­
tion « so far as» military requirements « permit » (76). Obviously, with 
regard to the activities involved in the prohibitions discussed above, the 
concept of necessity, a concept reflected in the formulation of the prohibi­
tions, is outweighed by the interest in reducing the effeets of war. Given 
that the Convention both recognizes these two compétitive values and sets 
forth instances where military requirements are not seen as preeminent to 
ameliorating the conséquences of war, it is quite reasonable to expect other 
cases in which humanitarianism may overshadow arguments for permitting 
armed forces to engage in conduct serving militarily useful purposes. If 
standards for civility in the prosecution of combat do not envision permit­
ting activity having a clear connection with military objectives when 
necessity is incorporated in the standards, then standards that are 
explicitly conditioned by necessity should be understood in precisely the 
same way. Just as humanitarianism compels avoidance of the kinds of con­
duct enumerated throughout the Hague régulations of 1907, so too in some 
instances it may compel the avoidance of property destruction because the 
inflicting army represents a nation engaged in a war of aggression. In both, 
the mere fact the conduct facilitâtes the accomplishment of a military 
objective is insufficiënt to support its legality.
(71) Id., at art. 52.
(72) Id., at art. 44.
(73) Id., at art. 23(f).
(74) Id., at art. 23(a).
(75) Id., at art. 23(c).
(76) Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, reprinted in 
The Laws of Armed Conflict, 57 at 63-64 (1). Schindler and J. Toman, eds., 1973).
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The invasion of the tiny Gulf sheikdom of Kuwait by the armed forces 
of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein presented a variety of international 
légal issues ranging from the inviolability of diplomatie premises to the 
protection of art treasures (77), damage to the environment (78) to inter­
vention to protect the minority Kurdish population from inhumane treat- 
ment (79). The principal issue surrounding the destruction of Kuwait’s oil 
resources, in response to coalition efforts eventually ousting the occupying 
Iraqi army, involves considération of Iraq’s aggression in determining 
whether the destruction was « imperatively demanded by the necessities of 
war ». What has been argued in the preceding pages is that the existence 
of illégal aggression undermines the ability of the destroying power to 
appropriately invoke military necessity as a basis for justification. The doc­
trine of necessity captured by the language of article 23(g) of the Hague 
régulations of 1907 envisions reference to the illégal nature of the overall 
conflict in deciding when destruction of property is permissible. Thus, with 
regard to réparations called for under Security Council Resolution 687, 
payments calculated on the basis of non-protected destruction must look 
far beyond what traditionally has been deemed sufficiënt.
(77) For a review of some of these fcopics see, M e r o n , «Prisoners of War, Civilians and 
Diplomats in the Gulf Crisis», 85, Am. J. int’l L., 104 (1991).
(78) See e.g., articles 53-55 of Protocol I  Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, reprinted in «Documents on the Laws of War», mpra, note 27, at 416-418. The Protocol 
was opened for signature on Dec. 12, 1977. On its current status see A l d b ic h , « Prospects of 
United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions», 85, Am. 
J. Int’l L.t 1 (1991), at 3 (Iraq not a party), 19 (question o f customary law problematic).
(79) See e.g. R i d in g ,  « Europeans Urging Enclave for Kurds in Northern Iraq », N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 9, 1991, A -l, col. 6 ; T y l e r , «Bush Sees Accord on ‘ Safe Havens’ For Kurds in Iraq», N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 12, 1991, A-3, col. 4 ; S o i o l in o ,  «Iraq Says U.N. Must Take Over Camps for 
Kurds», N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1991, A-6, col. 3 ; «A  Lifeline in Iraq», Newsweek, Apr. 29, 1991, 
at 18-21.
